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‘All historical experiences of sustained economic growth – starting at least from 
the English Industrial Revolution – find their enabling conditions in a rich set of 
complementary institutions, shared behavioural norms and public policies.’
1  
 
‘Competitive national industries have long been seen as the wealth-generating 
lifeblood of nations.’2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the current debate about industrial strategy and the UK’s 
hesitant acceptance of a possible role for the state in addressing the challenges 
confronting British industry in the wake of the 2007/8 financial crisis. In this 
context – and following the 2012 London Summer Games – political leaders 
have been pointing to the strategy that succeeded in reversing the British 
Olymic team’s fortunes following its nadir at the 1996 Atlanta Summer Games; 
and they are suggesting that there may be lessons for industry. However, the 
political rhetoric has yet to be translated into action. Analysis of the elite sport 
strategy, in the light of the evolving literature on industrial strategy and policy 
suggests that although there are details that are specific to sport, there are also 
aspects of the general strategic approach that can be used to inform the design 
and implementation of a strategy aimed at developing and improving the 
international competitive performance of UK industrial sectors and 
manufacturers. The significance of the UK elite sport strategy is that it was 
evolved and successfully implemented in the British social, political and 
economic context, building on and improving existing institutional capabilities.  
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1.Introduction 
 
In 2007/8, with the collapse of the American subprime real estate bubble – 
merely the most recent in a series of asset bubbles – the extended period of 
prosperity that had started in the early 1990s came to an abrupt end. The 
resulting pandemonium plunged the world into a financial crisis of 
unprecedented proportion that quickly spilled over into the real economy. In 
response, governments engaged in massive internationally coordinated stimulus 
programmes; and they rescued financial institutions that were deemed ‘too big 
to fail’. However, less than 18 months after the emergency measures, the 
markets’ unease about the resulting fiscal deficits and high levels of sovereign 
debt caused a sharp reversal in policy, as austerity measures replaced stimulus.  
 
As the global recession has deepened – made worse by generalized austerity – 
and with confidence in the financial sector severely shaken, policy-makers are 
looking for new sources of economic growth and employment creation; and 
‘there has been a “renaissance” of interest in industrial policy’ (Warwick 
2013:47). Even in the UK, where manufacturing has been largely neglected 
since the end of the 1970s – and had seen nothing in the way of a forward-
looking strategy for many years prior to that – things are starting to change. In a 
speech to the chairmen of Local Enterprise Partnerships in 2011, Prime Minister 
David Cameron acknowledged that radical change in the composition of the 
UK’s economy was necessary: ‘What we need to do in this country is a massive 
rebalancing of our economy. We have been too reliant on government spending, 
on housing and finance ... We have got to be more reliant on manufacturing and 
investment.’3 Whilst in part this sounds like a justification for a policy of 
austerity, rebalancing the economy towards manufacturing will require the 
evolution of some kind of industrial strategy. The question, particularly given 
the poor track record of the UK in this respect, is: what kind? 
 
In the on-going crisis, countries like Germany and Northern Italy, which have 
historically taken an active approach to industrial policy – and have proven 
much more resilient than others that have not – are attracting attention. But 
whilst there are certainly general lessons that can be learned from abroad, 
merely attempting to transplant policy from an economy with a completely 
different culture and institutional structure – not to mention starting point – is 
unlikely to be any more effective than it has been in the past.4 The more 
promising strategies for building global competitiveness are those that have 
already delivered success within a British context, since they share common 
historical, cultural and institutional roots. One such example became clearly 
apparent during the London 2012 Summer Olympic Games, when Team GB 
won 65 medals and earned for itself a world ranking of 3rd – up from its dismal 
performance in the 1996 Atlanta Summer Games, at which it placed 36th.  
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Whilst there are different views on industrial strategy and policy, interestingly, 
much of the more recent literature, particularly in the wake of the 2007/8 
financial crisis, suggests a similarity of approach with that underpinning the 
competitiveness of UK elite sports. We are therefore interested in exploring the 
extent to which economic necessity, recent thinking about industrial policy and 
the UK’s successful elite sports strategy might have similarities in terms of the 
direction of travel. Exploring the strategies, systems and institutional reforms 
underpinning the British Olympic team’s impressive competitive turn-around, 
we assess the degree to which they might inform strategy to build 
competitiveness in select sectors of UK industry. Of particular interest is the 
team’s approach to selecting the sports (and athletes) with the greatest potential 
for success and supporting their development into world class international 
competitors. Predictable financing, supported by National Lottery Funding from 
1994 onward, has been important; but equally so has been strategic leadership 
and vision, a culture of winning and an institutional structure to coordinate the 
efforts required for on-going competitive improvement. All of these are also 
likely to be components of a strategy for international competitiveness in 
business.  
 
The paper is laid out as follows: Section two explores the current debate about 
industrial policy and locates it in historical context, tracing the UK’s evolving 
approach to industrial policy and its – so far at least – hesitant acceptance of a 
role for the state in addressing the challenges resulting from the 2007/8 financial 
crisis. Section three examines the case of UK elite sport, focusing on its strategy 
for developing international competitiveness and Team GB’s resulting steady 
and sustained competitive improvement since the 1996 Atlanta Summer Games. 
Section four identifies aspects of this approach that might have application in 
select sectors of UK industry. Section five concludes and identifies some of the 
implications for policy as well as areas for further research. 
 
2.The evolving debate about industrial policy 
 
According to Pack and Saggi (2006):  
 
‘[f]ew phrases elicit such strong reactions from economists and policy-
makers as industrial policies ... those who believe strongly in the efficient 
working of markets view any argument in favour of industrial policy as 
fiction, or, worse, an invitation to rent-seeking, whereas those who 
believe that market failures are pervasive think that economic 
development requires a liberal dose of industrial policy.’5  
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Yet, as Bora et al (1999) point out, ‘... the term “industrial policy” is not a well-
defined one. It is ill-defined in relation to its objectives, the industries that are 
covered and the instruments that are used.’6  
 
Nevertheless, since the 2007/8 financial crisis, in response to the prospect of 
prolonged stagnation and longer-term concerns about the secular decline of 
manufacturing and the structural imbalances – trade, regional and sectoral – that 
have been revealed and exacerbated by the crisis, industrial policy has entered 
the policy agenda. This has produced a flurry of research on what it might 
involve and how it might help to address the structural challenges confronting 
not only the world’s developing countries but also its advanced industrialized 
economies. In this context, the debate has shifted from questioning ‘why’ and 
‘whether’ to use industrial policy to ‘what’ it comprises and ‘when’ and ‘how’ it 
might be most effectively deployed.7  
 
Within this literature, the definition of industrial policy ranges from ‘a set of 
policies aimed at improving the global competitiveness of domestic firms, 
industries and sectors’8 to a broader one involving   
 
‘any type of intervention or government policy that attempts to improve 
the business environment or to alter the structure of economic activity 
toward sectors, technologies or tasks that are expected to offer better 
prospects for economic growth or societal welfare than would occur in 
the absence of such intervention’.9  
 
As such, it involves three main areas of intervention: ‘vertical’ or selective 
policies, in which the government promotes certain sectors or firms;10 
‘horizontal’ or functional policies, in which the government supports activities 
that strengthen the competitiveness of broad segments of the economy’s supply 
side;11 and public-private strategic collaborations, involving ‘dialogue’ between 
the state and private sector to generate information for identifying opportunities 
for – and removing obstacles to – economic progress12 and to create and support 
the institutions, policies and activities underpinning ‘dynamic’ economic 
progress.13 
 
2.1. Evolution in the theory and practice of industrial policy 
 
Although the term ‘industrial policy’ is a relatively recent one, its history can be 
traced to the Industrial Revolution, which according to Robinson (2009:4) was the 
result of the ‘mother of all industrial policies’ ... ‘a vector of policies which 
probably constitutes one of the world’s most successful and most consequential 
industrial policies.’ Thus, contrary to the view that emerges from the writings of 
the 18th century British economists – of Britain as a free trade, free market 
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economy – it was in fact the first to employ industrial policies as a means of 
successfully industrializing. Following Britain’s lead, between the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the beginning of the First World War in1914, the 
rest of the developed countries also industrialized, aided in no small part by 
industrial policies of their own.14 In short, all of the major developed countries 
used high levels of government intervention (industrial policy) during the process 
of industrialization – although it may not have been identified as such. What 
differentiates them are ‘the instruments, institutional arrangements and philosophy 
of intervention’.15  
 
The modern debate about industrial policy originates in the 1970s and the rise 
of Japan, which was also the first country to use the term ‘industrial policy’ 
(sangyo seisaku) to describe selective industrial interventions.16 However, there 
had been an evolution in the rationale behind industrial intervention during the 
post war period that started much earlier.17 From the 1940s through the late 
1960s, with the rebuilding of war-torn Europe – and with it, acceptance of a role 
for the state in managing the economy – Western governments prioritized re-
industrialization. They sought to stimulate selected sectors of the economy 
through production subsidies, tax incentives and other state aids as well as to 
‘pick winners’ through nationalization and the promotion of national 
champions. Because of perceived benefits, in terms of both knowledge spill-
overs and dynamic economies of scale associated with linkages between 
industry and the economy – and the central role of manufacturing in this context 
– industry was given precedence and growth was encouraged through mergers 
and acquisitions.  
 
Underpinning this was empirical research on the sources of economic growth 
that identified technological progress as the driving force.18 But in spite of this, 
instead of developing new industries and technological capabilities, in response 
to pressure from politically well-connected special interest groups, UK 
industrial policy tended to take the form of shoring-up ailing industries and 
helping old ones to survive.19  It was consequently largely unsuccessful as a 
strategy for long-term industrial rejuvenation; and by the late 1960s, services – 
especially financial services – were rapidly displacing manufacturing as a driver 
of growth. 
 
In response to the ‘stagflationary’20 crisis of the 1970s, there was a retreat from 
active industrial policy to something closer to a market-driven, laissez-faire 
approach. Markets were deregulated and industries privatized. Confidence in 
the market mechanism to select sectors and firms and to allocate resources 
efficiently meant that the state was restricted to correcting market failures and 
supplying necessary public goods as well as to ensuring market freedom and a 
‘business friendly’ environment through product, labour and capital market 
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regulation and macroeconomic and financial market stability. Industrial policy 
thus took the form of limited, sector specific (often piecemeal) intervention, 
motivated by the need to correct market failures; and the policy debate revolved 
around consideration of the relative costs of ‘government failure’ as compared 
with market failure.  
 
This was also a period of growing confidence in financial markets – the stock 
market, in particular – as a driver of economic growth and a vehicle by which 
industry could be effectively restructured. The underlying rationale was based 
on the ‘efficient markets hypothesis’, that the stock market is an efficient 
market and that a firm’s share price is therefore an accurate reflection of the 
value of the underlying productive enterprise. Using this logic, the stock market 
was theorized to be an efficient ‘market for corporate control’ and the 
‘discipline mechanism’ by which under-performing management teams could 
be replaced with more effective ones by means of the hostile take-over.21 
However, the widespread use of leverage to finance hostile takeovers meant that 
the targets tended to be cash and asset rich companies, the selling-off of which 
could be used to repay the debt.22 Through this process, corporate raiders and 
stock market investors made enormous profits, fuelling a stock market boom 
that lent strength to the underlying theory, since the boom was interpreted as 
evidence of improved industrial performance. The reality, however, was that the 
consequence of asset stripping to repay the debt taken-on to finance hostile 
takeovers was the systematic dismantling vast segments of British industry. The 
resulting industrial unrest was met with fierce government opposition, which 
only exacerbated the problem. In the end, UK manufacturing capability was 
severely weakened. But rather than evolve a strategy for addressing the plight of 
industry, the general view was that the economy had progressed to a ‘post 
industrial’ service based stage of capitalism.23 
 
The neoclassical ‘market failure’ debate was ultimately broadened to recognise 
a role for the state in promoting ‘competitiveness’. During the 1990s, concerns 
about competitiveness resulted in a shift towards horizontal policies supporting 
a wider range of (primarily small) firms, industries and sectors.24 Mirroring 
similar initiatives by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)25 and the European Union (EU)26 successive UK 
governments produced Competitiveness White Papers27 setting out their vision 
for industrial policy and describing it as ‘active’ –  aimed not only at correcting 
market failures but also at strengthening the competitiveness of regions and 
firms by encouraging the development of technological and productive 
capabilities. According to Sharp (2001:2), the underlying rationale represented 
‘a dynamic extension of the neo-classical approach ... In particular, these 
theories which emphasise the externalities associated with R&D and the degree 
to which growth emerging from technological advances is “endogenised”.’ It 
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was felt that ‘[f]irms benefit not only from static economies of scale and scope 
but also, over time, from the cumulative learning embodied in building-up and 
maintaining a production process’.28 Thus, intervention took the form of 
horizontal policies, such as state support for investments in R&D, technology, 
education and training as well as selective policies aimed at high tech, advanced 
manufacturing and knowledge-intensive businesses.29  
 
2.2. Evolving ideas about economic development policy 
 
In the theory and practice of industrial policy aimed at economic development, 
prior to the 1970s there was general consensus that it was largely about the 
transformation of a country’s productive structure by means of industrialization. 
The focus then shifted – away from production and towards addressing the 
symptoms of under-development, such as ameliorating poverty and providing 
for basic needs.30 But during the 1990s, in response to the East Asian ‘miracle’ 
of the 1980s, the debate returned to the question of ‘picking winners’. What 
emerged was the neo-liberal ‘Washington Consensus’ that attempted to make 
the case that selectivity did more harm than good. Because governments were 
assumed to be incapable of effectively identifying ‘winners’ and targeting 
intervention – and ‘government failures’ were considered to be much more 
costly than market failures – there was no role for industrial policy.31 From this 
perspective, markets are prioritized and there is only a minimal role for the 
state, in providing essential public goods (such as education and infrastructure), 
macroeconomic stability and clear rules of the game.32 The neo-classical 
perspective thus sees economic development as being largely driven by 
accumulation – of investments in physical and human capital – with the 
assumption that the capabilities required to make productive use of these is 
relatively easy, if not automatic33. The aim of industrial policy is therefore to 
provide an enabling environment for private sector investors.  
 
Taking a pragmatic approach, some neo-classical economists, like Dani Rodrik, 
recognizing that ‘[m]arkets are not self-creating, self-regulating, self-stabilizing 
or self-legitimizing’,34 accept a role for government not only in correcting 
market failures but also in fostering the development of supporting non-market 
institutions. From this perspective, to function well, markets are seen to rely 
upon (1) market-creating institutions, such as property rights and legally 
binding contracts, to spur entrepreneurial activity and provide incentives for 
private economic actors to invest and to innovate; (2) market-regulating 
institutions to oversee product markets, labour markets and financial markets 
and to deal with externalities, economies of scale and information deficits; (3) 
market-stabilizing institutions, including fiscal and monetary policy institutions 
and a Central Bank, to mitigate the risk and uncertainty associated with 
macroeconomic and financial market instability and in so doing to provide an 
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enabling environment for private investment; and (4) market-legitimating 
institutions, including social insurance institutions and conflict management 
institutions, to provide social stability and cohesion.  However, ‘there is no 
single mapping between the market and the set of non-market institutions 
required to sustain it’.35 Because of differences in historical legacy, political 
economy and institutional capabilities, institutional arrangements are highly 
context specific. They therefore need to be built from the bottom-up, 
incorporating local knowledge and experience; institutions imposed from the 
top-down usually fail.36  
 
‘Structuralists’, like Sanjaya Lall, take the view that whilst markets are 
powerful forces, they are not perfect. They therefore require supporting non-
market institutions and government interventions not only to deal with market 
failures but also to improve on market outcomes. From this perspective, 
industrial policy in support of the development of non-market institutions is 
justified on the basis of high expected social returns.37 The market-generating 
and market-stimulating role of the state thus goes further, to enable and support 
industrial competitiveness through the generation of technological capabilities 
and the capacity to innovate and to learn. In contrast to the neo-classical view, 
acknowledgement of past policy failures does not imply that the costs of 
government failure are always higher than those of market failure; rather, past 
policy mistakes can be a source of learning, to improve the capabilities of 
government.38  Taking an evolutionary perspective, structuralists see economic 
performance in terms of the rate and nature of progress, which itself is a 
learning process. The economy is thus always in a process of change, where 
economic growth is ‘the result of the co-evolution of technologies, firm and 
industry structures, supporting and governing institutions’.39 In this context, 
industrial policy is about ‘creating winners’ within a market environment, 
where the state provides leadership and support for continuous competitive 
improvement. However, its effectiveness depends upon political accountability, 
social cohesion and the benefits of economic progress being widely shared.40 
 
The East Asian experience also sparked interest in the role that the state might 
play in facilitating coordination, building institutions, developing networks, 
fostering systems and aligning strategic priorities.41 This ‘systems based’ 
thinking is well summarized by Chang (1998:54): 
 
‘One interesting thing that has emerged from the debate on industrial 
policy of the last two decades or so is the recognition that industrial 
policy is more about broad ‘vision’ and co-ordination than about doling 
out subsidies or providing trade protections. Many commentators have 
pointed out that the East Asian countries do not necessarily spend more 
money on industrial policy than others, but that their industrial policy is 
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more successful because they have a dense institutional network of co-
ordination that facilitates information flows between the government and 
business, on the one hand, and between firms, on the other hand. It is also 
pointed out that industrial policies in these countries work not only by 
providing detailed solutions to specific sectoral problems but also by 
providing a broad ‘vision’ of the future of the economy, along which a 
voluntary co-ordination of activities could be achieved by private sector 
agents. In short, the recent debate has revealed that the issue of 
organisational design and institutional building is as much, if not more, 
important in determining the success of industrial policy as the issue of 
designing incentive schemes.’ 
 
2.3. ‘New thinking’ about industrial policy 
 
Since the 2007/8 financial crisis, the systems-based approach to industrial 
policy has been increasingly taken-up by academics and policy-makers in the 
world’s advanced economies. Thus, whilst this ‘new industrial policy’ thinking 
had been evolving for many years in the economic development literature – and 
was being incorporated into policy in some developing countries – it has only 
recently attracted the attention of policy-makers in the world’s industrialized 
economies. As a result, contributors to the current debate come from a wide 
range of very different perspectives; and the systems-based approach is an 
eclectic one that is emerging from the cross-fertilization of ideas from 
economics,42 political economy, strategic management and industrial 
psychology.  
 
As discussed above, although the specifics of industrial policy are necessarily 
heavily dependent upon a country’s local circumstances and institutional 
capabilities, there are nevertheless some general principles that have been 
identified as useful in guiding the design of policy. Taking a market-failure 
perspective, Rodrik (2009:19-21) identifies the main ‘elements of an 
institutional architecture’ for industrial policy as being: high level political 
leadership and support; institutions within which information sharing and social 
learning can take place; and mechanisms ensuring transparency and 
accountability. In other words, effective industrial policy requires clearly 
articulated shared objectives as well as ‘embeddedness’, ‘carrots and sticks’ and 
‘accountability’.43  
 
Because knowledge about the existence and location of spill-overs, obstacles to 
structural change and market failures are widely diffused, industrial policy 
needs to be embedded within society: there must be institutions at the national, 
sub-national and sectoral levels within which public and private actors can 
come together not only to share information and to solve problems in the 
9 
 
productive sphere but also to learn about the opportunities and constraints faced 
by the other. There must be governance systems to detect and correct mistakes 
and to manage associated vested interests; and because special interest groups 
and recipients of public support have strong incentives to pressure the 
government for policies that serve their own interests, there must be safeguards 
against ‘capture’. Conditions for support must be clearly articulated and there 
must be mechanisms for monitoring performance and sanctioning under-
performance.  Finally, because society at large is intended to be the ultimate 
beneficiary of industrial policy, there must be participatory political institutions 
to ensure legitimacy and consent and mechanisms to ensure transparency and 
accountability.44 For Rodrik (2009:100),  
 
‘the right model for industrial policy is ... strategic collaboration between 
the private sector and the government, with the aim of uncovering the 
most significant obstacles to restructuring and determining what 
interventions are most likely to remove them. Correspondingly, the 
analysis of industrial policy needs to focus ... on getting the policy 
process right’. 
 
Tracing the development of modern economic growth theory, Nelson (2008:13) 
goes further, arguing that by ‘bringing institutions under the umbrella of 
evolutionary theory, evolutionary economics now has the capability to provide a 
broad, coherent and useful theory of economic growth as experienced in the 
advanced industrial economies.’ Building on the work of the structuralist 
development economists, evolutionary economists take a dynamic view of 
industrial policy, in which innovation and learning processes assume a central 
role. In this, markets, themselves, are institutions, the effectiveness of which 
‘cannot be separated from the contribution of supporting institutions and 
policies’.45 However, as Nelson (2008) points out, it is important ‘to recognize 
the complexity of many market relationships, their embedding in broader social 
and institutional structures, and the elements of co-operation and trust that often 
are essential if markets are to work well.’46  
 
The ‘innovation systems’ literature recognizes this complexity and sees a 
country’s national system of innovation – encompassing ‘the wide range of 
institutions that are involved in supporting and orienting the dynamics of 
economic activity where innovation is the key driving force’47 – as being an 
important source of competitive advantage. Here, an important focus is ‘on the 
processes for the generation, absorption and commercial exploitation of 
knowledge,’ which, in contrast to the neo-classical approach, is viewed as 
‘heterogeneous, context-specific, tacit and “sticky”’.48 From this perspective, 
because of the evolutionary nature of economic systems and institutions – and 
the importance of recognizing and responding effectively to changes in the 
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competitive environment – there must be processes to ensure that emerging 
opportunities and constraints are identified and that the system is able to adjust 
accordingly. Industrial policy must therefore be capable of adapting to 
accommodate shifting environmental conditions. To avoid ‘lock-in’ to 
outmoded standards or practices and to facilitate movement to better ones, the 
industrial strategy process must facilitate the participation of a wide range of 
groups, not only in identifying areas for improvement but also in coordinating 
movement of the system towards superior activities.49  
 
The systems-based approach has been described by some as ‘soft’ industrial 
policy,50 ‘based on a more facilitative, co-ordinating role for government’ where 
the objective is ‘to develop ways for government and industry to work together 
to set strategic priorities, deal with co-ordination problems, allow for 
experimentation, avoid capture by vested interests and improve productivity’.51 
Considering the relationship between the state and private actors in managing 
the process of economic development, Griffiths and Zammuto (2005) draw on 
the political economy and strategic management perspectives about the 
competitiveness of national industries and firms. In contrast to the traditional 
approach that views them as competing, they argue that when viewed as 
parallel, insights emerge ‘that are not inherent in either body of literature 
alone’.52  Whereas the orientation of the political economy literature is largely 
state-centric (arguing that national competitiveness is enhanced by government 
intervention), the strategic management perspective is largely firm-centric 
(arguing that minimal government intervention delivers competitiveness). 
However, when the focus is shifted to the interaction between state and firm 
actors in decisions affecting the structuring of industry, a ‘joint governance’ 
approach is much more effective in promoting national competitive advantage 
than relying on markets, firms or government alone. 
 
2.4. The UK’s (belated) ‘renaissance of interest’ in industrial policy 
 
Until very recently, the UK did not explicitly embrace the idea of industrial 
policy. This is despite calls from prominent captains of industry for leadership 
and support. In the 2007 Gabor Lecture at Imperial College, entitled ‘Why 
Manufacturing Matters’, Sir John Rose, chief executive of Rolls-Royce, 
expressed the view that since the mid 1960s, the UK’s increasing reliance on the 
services sector, particularly financial services, created growing risks for the 
economy as a whole.  Advocating support for ‘high value’ manufacturing to act 
as a counter-balance to high value services, he called for the creation of a more 
diversified economy. He urged the government to provide a clearer sense of 
direction for UK industry, highlighting the need to articulate both its objectives 
with regard to the kind of manufacturing industry it would like to see develop 
and a strategy for achieving them. ‘We need,’ Rose said, ‘a framework, or a 
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business route map, to create context, drive focus and help prioritise public and 
private sector investment.’53   
 
However, he acknowledged the political obstacles to making progress in these 
areas. Although New Labour had been in government for over a decade, the 
non-interventionist stance inherited from the Thatcher government remained in 
place: ‘Unfortunately, the fear of returning to anything that remotely resembles 
centralized industrial planning has resulted in even the discussion of such a 
framework being off limits’.54 
  
Several months later, at a meeting of the House of Commons Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee in February 2008, Rose 
responded to questions from MPs about the future of manufacturing in the UK. 
When asked what the main aspects of a manufacturing strategy should be, he 
replied: ‘In general, the government should do more to set priorities ... It should 
have a better view about the technologies that the UK needs in the future and set 
future priorities. If you ask me about a lack of technology vision and sufficient 
amounts of funding, then both need to be improved’.55 
 
Later in the year, with the recession deepening and unemployment continuing to 
mount, New Labour took its first hesitant steps towards accepting a possible 
role for industrial policy, with the appointment of Peter Mandelson as Business 
Secretary. Believing that the UK had become overly reliant on the financial 
services sector, Mandelson saw the need to rebalance the economy and sought 
advice from Rose and other British industrialists. The result was a 2009 white 
paper, entitled New Industry, New Jobs: Building Britain’s Future,56 calling for 
a ‘new activism’ on the part of government to assist businesses in exploiting 
new, advanced technologies by means of ‘targeted intervention’. To strengthen 
the economy’s capacity for innovation, growth and job creation, a Strategic 
Investment Fund (SIF) was established, supporting a range of investments 
across the UK economy.   
 
However, progress stalled when the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition came to office after the 2010 general election; and the SIF was 
discontinued. In a speech at the Cass Business School, the new Secretary for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, told the audience that ‘[w]hat we 
shouldn’t be doing is trying to micromanage the economy at the level of 
individual companies or so-called national champions: trying to supersede the 
judgement of markets’.57  
 
But the government soon started moving closer to acknowledgement of a role 
for the state in providing greater support for industry. In 2011, it set out its 
vision for the economy’s recovery in The Plan For Growth,58 which included 
12 
 
horizontal industrial policy measures and the identification of key sectors where 
barriers to growth were to be addressed. In his 2011 Budget Statement, George 
Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, talked about the need for a ‘march of the 
makers’.59 And in a speech at the Policy Exchange, Cable called for a ‘New 
Industrial Policy’ aimed at supporting innovation and technological leadership, 
developing skills (centred on apprenticeships), re-building supply chains and 
implementing supply-side reforms as a means of building and maintaining 
business confidence.60 In September 2012, with the London 2012 Olympic 
Games still alive in the public imagination, Cable set out his expanded vision 
for a long-term UK industrial strategy – making direct reference to the strategy 
that had contributed to Britain’s Olympic success: 
 
‘Over the last few weeks the papers have been full of pictures of athletes. 
The Olympics provided a unique opportunity to celebrate the things the 
UK does well. ... Our athletes achieved what they did because of their 
years of commitment and planning. I was initially a sceptic; I could see 
the costs but not the benefits. But the games proved to be a success. Years 
of planning and investment in pursuit of a clear and ambitious vision 
were realised. ... I think there is a read-across to the way we approach our 
economic future. We need to take the same approach: a clear, ambitious 
vision; the courage to take decisions that bear fruit over a long period; 
openness to new opportunities as they develop; focus on the things we do 
best; and an enduring commitment far beyond a five year parliament or 
spending review period’.61 
 
Thus, whilst much of the discussion about ‘Olympic Legacy’ following the 
London 2012 Summer Games has focussed on sport-related issues, policy-
makers and politicians from across the political spectrum are also looking for 
parallels that might be drawn between the approach that succeeded in turning 
around the international competitiveness of UK elite sport and the lessons that 
might be learned for evolving industrial strategy to address the challenges 
currently facing key sectors of the UK economy. We thus now turn to an 
analysis of the approach taken by the UK elite sports system, which has much in 
common with the current systems based approach to industrial policy. Like 
business, prior to the strategic changes initiated during the 1990s, UK elite sport 
had also suffered from a history of poorly informed intervention, lack of stable 
funding and little in the way of support services; and like much of UK business 
– manufacturing in particular – it was up against competitors that had none of 
these disadvantages.  
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3. ‘Creating winners’ in UK elite sport 
 
The performance of the British Olympic team at the 2012 Summer Olympic 
Games marks yet another stage in its remarkable competitive turn-around since 
its dismal showing in Atlanta 1996. The change in the team’s fortunes has also 
been extremely rapid. As early as the following Games in Sydney, its 
performance had clearly improved, with steady gains being realized ever since. 
Whereas the team won 15 medals in Atlanta – only one of which was gold – it 
won 28 in Sydney, going on to win 30 medals in Athens 2004, 47 in Beijing 
2008 and 65 in London 2012. In the overall Summer Games’ world ranking, the 
UK climbed from 36th in 1996 to 3rd in 2012. Team GB has also performed well 
in the Paralympic Summer Games, holding the world ranking of 2nd since the 
2000 Games and 3rd in 2012, where it still exceeded its target of 103 medals, 
taking home 120 (of which 34 were gold). 
 
Despite these overall results, Team GB’s performance has not improved 
uniformly across all sports; nor has the improvement been as obvious in its 
performance in the Winter Olympic Games. In both cases, this is a consequence 
of strategically selecting those sports in which the UK has a realistic chance of 
international success and targeting resources accordingly – ‘picking winners’ is 
thus at the heart of the elite sport strategy. The results are quite clear: Team 
GB’s performance has improved most markedly in athletics (moving from 25th 
in 1996 to 4th in 2012); cycling (moving from 12th in 1996 to 1st in 2008 and 
2012); rowing (moving from 7th in 1996 to 1st in 2008 and 2012); sailing 
(moving from 9th in 1996 to 1st in 2000, 2004 and 2008 and 3rd in 2012); and 
swimming (moving from 12th in 1996 to 3rd in 2008, but falling back to 14th in 
2012).62 All of these are sports selected for competitive support. In the Winter 
Games, the British Olympic team moved from Bronze to Gold between 1994 
and 2010; but only 2 medals were won in 2002 (one bronze and one gold) and 
one each in 1998 (Bronze), 2006 (Silver) and 2010 (Gold). The UK’s Winter 
Olympics world ranking also improved rather less dramatically, from 21st in 
1994 to 16th in 2010.  
 
3.2. From indifference to cooperation: Politics and UK sport 
 
As discussed above with respect to UK industrial policy, Conservative 
governments of the 1980s espoused the view that markets should be prioritized 
and that, as far as possible, the state should not get involved in private sector 
activities. A similar approach applied with respect to sport, where the UK’s 
Sports Councils (for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) 
maintained a generalist role in sport promotion, under the ‘Sport for All’ credo. 
However, when Margaret Thatcher was unseated as prime minister in 1990 and 
was succeeded by John Major, a decade of political indifference towards sport 
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was brought to an end. Unlike Thatcher, who saw no real benefit in sport, 
Major, himself a lifelong cricket fan, discerned the political relevance of sport – 
and it was his strong personal support that would prove instrumental in the 
strategic changes of the 1990s upon which the British Olympic Team’s 
competitive turn-around was based.63  
 
Among the first of the institutional changes affecting British sport policy was 
the separation of elite from mass-participation sport. In July 1994, the Sports 
Minister, Iain Sproa, outlined proposals to replace the UK Sports Councils with 
the UK Sports Council (UKSC) (for elite sports) and the Home Country Council 
(for mass-participation sports). The UK also started to ‘pick winners’; whereas 
the former Sports Councils concentrated on around 110 sports, the new UKSC 
concentrated on around 30. Thus, it no longer funded over a hundred different 
sports, regardless of performance potential, as it had before. Instead, funding 
was targeted on those sports in which the UK stood a realistic chance of 
international success – reducing the number by around seventy five percent.  
 
During the early 1990s, whilst it was clear that lack of political interest had 
resulted in the chronic under-funding of UK elite sport – both in absolute terms 
and by comparison to other countries – it was less clear how this could be 
addressed. With the UK in the grip of recession, devoting exchequer funding to 
sport was more likely to create political enemies than capital, particularly in the 
wake of ‘Black Wednesday,’ and Sterling’s humiliating exit from the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992, which had already severely 
damaged the government’s reputation for financial prudence.  
 
An alternative to exchequer funding, however, lay in national lottery funding, 
an idea that many other countries in Europe had already successfully adopted. 
This had been mooted under Thatcher, who disapproved on the basis that some 
people would ‘get something for nothing’, with others objecting to the 
government promoting gambling. With Thatcher’s exit, the way was open for 
change; and in 1993, under licence by the Major government, the UK’s National 
Lottery was set-up, with around 30 percent of the proceeds earmarked for good 
causes. The idea of a lottery was not, however, simply borrowed from Europe. 
Whereas most European lotteries are operated by the state, the UK lottery, in 
line with the culture of the time, is privately operated on a state-franchised 
basis. The first draw was made in November 1994 – some eighteen months 
before the poor showing of UK elite sport at the Atlanta Olympics in 1996. But 
lottery funding was only to be the first of a few, albeit highly significant, 
changes in the government’s approach to elite sport.  
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In addition to significantly increased funding, Major’s government also initiated 
the primary institutional change affecting British elite sport by creating the 
quango,64 UK Sport, to replace the UKSC as the strategic lead body for elite 
sport, having much closer links with the British Olympic Association. Although 
mooted in 1994, following the British Olympic team’s disappointing 
performance in the 1996 Atlanta Summer Games, UK Sport was set-up in 
January 1997 and granted a licence to distribute Lottery funding to elite sport 
shortly afterwards. There were discussions about establishing a UK Academy of 
Sport. But less than three months later, John Major was swept out of office by 
New Labour. 
 
Under Tony Blair’s New Labour government, one of the most positive 
developments impacting British elite sport was a major change in the uses to 
which lottery funding could be put. Instead of restricting it to the funding of 
facilities, it was decided that money could be allocated to individual athletes. 
Not only did this mean that athletes were no longer obliged to juggle 
employment with training and competition; it also meant that funding could be 
allocated to coaches and other specialists.  
 
But it was not all good news: the new administration also brought the debacle of 
the 2005 Athletics World Championships, which came on the heels of two 
unsuccessful bids by UK cities to host the Olympic Games. As far as the 
Olympic bids were concerned, the International Olympic Committee had listed 
various reasons for rejecting the Birmingham bid for the 1992 Games, including 
lack of support from the Thatcher government. But Manchester’s bid for the 
2000 Games did little better, despite strong and active support from the Major 
government. It was thus generally felt that only London had the international 
clout to succeed in bringing the Olympics to the UK. But having won the right 
to host the 2005 Athletics World Championships in London, governmental lack 
of support was to intervene once again, threatening to undermine the ability of 
the UK to attract major international sporting events in the future.  
 
In 2001, the then Sports Minister, Richard Caborn, and Culture Secretary, Tessa 
Jowell, decided that the cost of constructing a new stadium at Picketts Lock, in 
London, would be too high – and suggested hosting the Championships at 
existing facilities in Sheffield, instead. This plan was rejected, on the basis that 
having London as the host city had been a key part of the decision to accept the 
London bid. London was thus forced to withdraw its offer to host the World 
Championships, which instead went to Helsinki. This was widely considered to 
be a humiliating result, as it was the first time that any developed nation had 
withdrawn an offer to host a major international sporting event.65 However, it 
did not undermine London’s bid to host the 2012 Olympics, which served to 
reinforce a very high profile, medium-term commitment to elite sport; and any 
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under-performance – by organisers or the team – would be not only very public 
but also politically unhelpful.   
 
By the time 2012 arrived, New Labour had been unseated by the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government, the UK was once again in recession 
and the cost of hosting the Olympics was being questioned. But in a subtle twist 
of irony, from 2010 onwards, the coalition government’s backing for the 
London 2012 Olympics was based on the argument that it would support both 
the UK’s construction and tourism industries – which is very close to a 
Conservative-led government ‘picking winners’ in the private sector. 
 
3.3. The UK elite sport competitiveness development system 
 
Much of the credit for the steady and significant improvement in the British 
Olympic team’s fortunes has been given to the increased funding provided by 
the National Lottery and the strategic leadership provided by UK Sport; and 
both have certainly played a significant part. According to Liz Nicholl, a former 
international netball player and now the Chief Executive of UK Sport, ‘we were 
investing in the outcome of medal success.’66 Since Olympic medallists attract 
additional funding from commercial sponsorship, UK Sport’s investment of 
public funds has set into motion a virtuous cycle in which public investment is 
augmented by private sector investment funding. This enables UK Sport to 
oversee a financially well-resourced system in support of the processes of 
indentifying talent and developing the Olympic medal winning capabilities of 
UK athletes and sports.  
 
But finance is not the only critical success factor. Working with the UK’s 
national sport governing bodies (NSGBs), UK Sport’s mission is to lead elite 
sport in the UK to world-class success. According to Baroness Sue Campbell, 
also a former international netball player, and current Chair of UK Sport, in 
addition to predictable funding and a new culture focused on winning, ‘the other 
big deciding factor was leadership. Someone had to articulate the mission and 
the vision.’67 The people responsible for such leadership include UK Sport’s 
Performance Director, working in partnership with the Performance Directors of 
the UK’s NSGBs and with the British Olympic and Paralympic Associations.  
 
Thus, at the highest institutional level within the UK’s elite sport development 
system, there is strategic collaboration between UK Sport and the NSGBs, with 
the shared objective of creating and maintaining a system that supports the UK 
Olympic team’s continuous improvement in international competitiveness. UK 
Sport serves as strategic lead body and the facilitator of the processes required 
for building international competitiveness, with the NSGBs having input into 
what those processes include and how they are carried out. Because the 
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knowledge of how to recognize talent and what is required to succeed within 
particular disciplines resides at the level of the individual sports, the sharing of 
information between the NSGBs and UK Sport is essential in designing and 
maintaining effective processes that support their shared objective; and by 
facilitating the sharing of information among the NSGBs, the individual sports 
also benefit from the ability to learn from each other. Although competitiveness 
development programmes within particular sport disciplines vary, by facilitating 
information flows between UK Sport and the NSGBs – and between the 
individual sport disciplines – and by continually mapping the international 
sporting landscape, the UK elite sport competitiveness development programme 
as a whole is designed to evolve to meet changing requirements, exploit 
opportunities and remove obstacles as they become apparent. It is also able to 
not only identify the athletes and sports with the potential for international 
success that should receive support – and to target resources accordingly – but 
also to identify those for whom support should be reduced, or withdrawn, due to 
under-performance or obsolescence. In short, UK Sport’s responsibilities are  
 
‘essentially ... to underpin and unlock the nation’s Olympic and Paralympic 
performance potential by: investing a significant majority of its income into 
the World Class Performance Programme, and working closely with the 
national governing bodies of sport to ensure they operate as effectively as 
possible; working with partners to develop the people and systems that 
support our leading athletes, principally in the areas of coaching, talent 
identification and sports science and medicine practitioners and Performance 
Lifestyle, to ensure a continuing legacy for our investment; [and] seeking 
cutting edge research and innovative solutions to performance challenges’.68 
 
With the support of UK Sport, the identification of talent and coordination of 
the processes supporting the competitive development of UK elite athletes who 
actually deliver success by winning medals takes place at the level of the 
NSGBs. Here, athletes receive support on three levels: ‘Talent’, ‘Development’ 
and ‘Podium’. Thus, from the early stages of athletic development when talent 
is first identified, a ‘no compromise approach’ is taken in targeting investment 
funding towards athletes most likely to deliver medals at Olympic and 
Paralympic level, and resourcing them through world-class coaching, training 
and competition support, plus cutting-edge medical and scientific services, 
state-of-the-art sport facilities, means-tested ‘Athlete Personal Awards’ to help 
cover living and sporting expenses, and professional development support after 
sport.  
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Figure 1: UK elite sport competitiveness development programme 
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The structure of the UK elite sport competitiveness development programme is 
illustrated in Figure 2. As discussed above, UK Sport works in partnership with 
the NSGBs to provide strategic leadership and joint governance in support of 
the processes designed to identify, develop and hone UK elite sport competitive 
capabilities with the objective of maximizing the potential to deliver medals at 
international sporting events. The services supporting the identification of talent 
and the building and strengthening of competitive capabilities are resourced by 
UK sport, with additional support from external funding sources, particularly in 
the areas of research and innovation. Working in partnership with the NSGBs, 
the UK Sport Talent Team identifies promising athletic talent, whose eligibility 
is to be confirmed for performance support services; these include coaching, 
sport medicine, sport science, performance lifestyle and research and 
innovation. In order to create a system that maximizes medal winning 
opportunities for British elite athletes, the Innovation and Research Programme 
supports innovation and research in the areas of training science, performance 
medicine, equipment and coaching technologies. By working in partnership 
with the NSGBs, ideas that might be developed and evolved to improve the 
performance of British athletes are actively solicited. The People Development 
Programme supports the development of talent in such areas as identifying, 
coaching and nurturing UK athletic talent; and the International Influence 
Programme ensures that there are people representing UK elite sport in key 
places, internationally, to ensure that the UK has ‘voice’ and the ability to 
influence decisions in the global development of sport.   
 
The institutional environment within which UK elite sport operates is therefore 
no longer comparable to that of a ‘free’ market system; but it is most definitely 
a ‘competitive’ one. There is competition for team places as well as for funding, 
both within individual sports and between different sports. However, 
competition takes place within a framework designed to maximize performance 
in the areas selected, to enable learning from failures and, where possible, 
turning them back into successes. This requires a very active and strategic role 
for UK Sport and the NSGBs; and it demands formulation of both short- and 
long-term objectives within a system designed to produce a continuous stream 
of winners.  
 
Baron Sebastian Coe, a former double gold medallist and Chair of the London 
2012 Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, sums up 
the requirements for competitive success in high performance sport:  
 
‘there are four things you need. You need them all. Smart governing 
bodies, world-class coaches, talented athletes with the good sense to pick 
their parents carefully, then you need predictable levels of funding.’69  
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Thus, from 1997 onward, Britain’s Olympic performance was no longer 
entrusted to the random interplay of competitive market forces and chance. 
 
3.4. Potential challenges ahead, not least of all, ‘political’ ones 
 
It is significant that UK Sport is a quango70 – a public sector body, responsible 
for the investment of public funds – and that it has (so far) apparently not only 
managed to help deliver Olympic competitive success, it has also managed to 
protect itself from political decisions that might compromise its ability to 
deliver on its strategic objectives. UK Sport has also managed to avoid being 
‘captured’ by elite sport. In many respects, Team GB’s success in the 2012 
Olympics provides evidence that UK Sport represents a significant public sector 
success story. 
 
However, vulnerability to political decisions should not be underestimated. 
Even during the 2012 Games, UK Sport’s certainty about exchequer funding 
extended only as far as the first part of 2015 – the period covered by the last 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), but only halfway through the run-up 
to the 2016 Summer Games in Rio. Following the success of Team GB in 
London 2012 – and under heavy pressure from the British media and public – 
the government made an exception to its spending rules and guaranteed funding 
for the first two years of the next CSR period, 2015-16 and 2016-17. This 
provides financial certainty to plan for the next Olympic Games. However, 
according to Matt Slater, BBC sport news correspondent, the government’s 
financial commitment ‘ignores inflation and a predicted drop off in commercial 
backing. So how UK Sport shares out the cash is the crucial issue. There will be 
winners and losers.’71  
 
In a more promising motion – that would further reduce financial uncertainty 
over the longer-term and reduce Team GB’s vulnerability to the vicissitudes of 
politics – Labour Leader Ed Miliband is proposing a cross-party review of the 
elite sport funding system: ‘My proposal to David Cameron has been to put 
together a 10-year plan across all parties. Let’s not make it political, let’s get all 
the sporting bodies involved and look at how we do it.’72 
 
4. UK Olympic legacy for business 
 
Clearly, sport is a different business from other industries, with its own 
structure, culture and peculiarities. But if the approach adopted by UK elite 
sport is viewed not as a ‘strategy for sport’ but as a strategy designed to build 
and maintain international competitiveness, more potentially transferable 
insights for industry begin to emerge. Since many of the approaches to elite 
sport competitiveness are non-sport specific – and therefore also not industry 
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specific – our analysis takes this as its starting point and avoids delving into the 
minutiae specific to winning a gold medal in a particular discipline. Instead, we 
consider the case of UK elite sport from the perspective of the systems based 
approach, which allows us to identify some of the most significant strategic 
components that might be adapted to inform thinking about the design of policy 
aimed at strengthening the international competitiveness of select sectors of UK 
industry. Given the general impression that the term ‘policy’ implies a 
politically driven, top-down approach, rather than the coordinated actions of 
both governmental and non governmental institutions to fulfil a commonly held 
set of ambitions, we use the term ‘industrial strategy’ to describe this approach 
for industry. 
 
In general, the objective of industrial strategy is to improve the international 
(market) competitiveness of a country’s firms and industrial sectors through 
interventions that not only counter ‘market failures’ but also improve on market 
outcomes. It includes horizontal policies designed to improve broad segments of 
the economy’s supply side, vertical policies aimed at particular sectors, firms or 
activities and public-private strategic collaborations to improve the international 
environment within which firms and industries operate. Because markets are 
embedded in broader social and institutional structures, the effectiveness of 
industrial strategy depends to a large extent upon local circumstances and 
capabilities as well as the existence of institutions in which information can be 
shared and social learning can take place. 
 
In the case of UK elite sport, two broad areas stand out as contributing to the 
reversal in the British Olympic team’s fortunes following the 1996 Atlanta 
Summer Games and to supporting its steady improvement ever since. These 
include: (1) an enabling competitive environment in which access to a reliable 
source of finance forms an important part and (2) an institutional structure to 
provide strategic leadership and support as well as to coordinate the 
identification of potential ‘winners’ and the on-going competitive improvement 
of elite athletes and sporting teams. The UK elite sport strategy is also one that 
encourages and facilitates the dynamic processes underpinning learning, 
innovation and responsiveness to changes in environmental opportunities and 
constraints. Taken together, these areas – if available to medium sized UK 
businesses and industrial sectors – would facilitate improvement in the UK’s 
international industrial performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
4.1. Team GB and ‘UK Ltd’ 
 
It is significant that prior to changes in both funding and strategic leadership 
following the Atlanta Games, the British Olympic team was in a not dissimilar 
position to that faced by many UK small and medium sized manufacturing 
businesses today. The NSGBs were for the most part under-resourced and 
operating largely independently of each other, in a ‘laissez faire’ system with 
little or no strategic leadership and support. The disjointed nature of sport policy 
in the UK is evident in recognition by the Sports Council in 1993 that ‘the UK’s 
sporting achievements have too often been secured in spite of the disparate 
goals having been set by our sporting community.’73  
 
In any given year, only a handful of athletes managed to fight their way to 
Olympic or Paralympic level; but with no effective organizational structure, 
athletes competed largely as individuals, with little or no access to the resources 
of a team within which to develop their capabilities, learn from each others’ 
experience and build upon it for future events. According to Peter Keen, a 
former cycling world champion and coach,  
 
‘My career in sport, pre-lottery, was that of a classic Alpinist. We were 
trying to climb this thing, but we weren’t leaving any maps or ropes for 
anyone else. If anything, quite the reverse. That switch from one-off 
success to an approach that is a quite different set of values is probably 
the single biggest difference.’74 
 
Thus, it was his conviction that ‘the challenge was to convert those highly 
motivated, highly talented individuals into a system’.75 Between 1997 and 2003, 
as Performance Director of British Cycling – working in partnership with UK 
Sport and the Performance Directors of the other NSGBs and armed with 
National Lottery funding – Keen set off a revolution that ultimately transformed 
the sport, with the British cycling team rising to dominate world cycling events. 
He went on, in 2004, to serve as Performance Director of UK Sport, where he 
applied the same philosophy to British Olympic sport as a whole, with similar 
effect. 
 
This shift – from a group of talented individuals succeeding against the odds, to 
a system designed to build and maintain competitiveness over time – is also the 
starting point for conceptualizing an effective strategy for industry. The two 
main components of the system – an enabling, competitive environment, 
including access to a competitive source of finance, and an institutional 
structure capable of providing strategic leadership and support as well as 
coordinating the identification and support of potential ‘winners’ are also 
applicable to industry. The way in which these systems are constructed and 
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operated, however, cannot simply be copied – for precisely the same reasons 
that the UK elite sport system could not be a carbon copy of the Australian 
system from which it took inspiration. To be effective, the approach to 
industrial strategy must fit the situation, culture, institutional structure and 
objectives of the economy and business sectors to which it is being applied.  
 
Beyond these two high level components of the elite sport strategy, there are 
also other components that might be used to help inform a competitiveness 
strategy for smaller businesses within selected UK manufacturing sectors. 
Whilst raw talent is still crucially important, much of the British Olympic 
team’s success is founded on recognising areas of potential competitive success; 
identifying likely winners early-on; supporting, training and coaching them to 
maximise their chances of developing into world-class competitors; and 
providing the predictable financial resources and the organisation required for 
these strategic processes to work effectively. All of these have strong parallels 
to the essential components of a strategy for competitive success in business.  
 
Britain clearly possesses the entrepreneurial, production and innovation 
capabilities required to successfully compete in global markets. In a wide range 
of industries – from sparkling wine to audio equipment and sports cars – British 
producers regularly win international awards. However, the absence of a 
coherent and effective institutional framework within which they, along with 
emerging and future businesses, can develop the strategic capabilities required 
for continued international competitive success, is hampering the performance 
of these and other sectors. It is therefore also hampering the performance of the 
broader economy of which they form a part. 
 
4.2. Enabling competitive environment 
 
Peter Keen’s reference to his early ‘Alpinist’ experience in UK elite sport 
highlights the value of an enabling competitive environment, in which athletes 
and teams are able to focus on developing their competitive capabilities, rather 
than being distracted by too many other considerations. Finance has been given 
much of the credit for the success of UK elite sport; but as we have seen, Peter 
Keen cites the development of the system as being important. The reality is that 
both views are probably correct. Finance is essential and in many ways serves 
as a foundational component of the elite sport system. However, it is important 
to recognise that finance is not, in itself, sufficient: it allows the system to exist, 
function and develop. But neither the system nor funding can work effectively 
without the other. 
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At the time the under-funding of elite sport was acknowledged, the UK 
economy was, as it is at present, in recession. This helped provide the impetus 
for a National Lottery, to provide funding for sport without placing additional 
demands on the exchequer – which would likely have had adverse political 
consequences.  However, it was the political leadership of the John Major 
Government that ultimately effected the changes required to set-up the Lottery 
and to establish the public sector strategic lead body, UK Sport, to invest almost 
a third of the proceeds in UK elite sport. Predictable funding, in turn, facilitated 
the setting-up – and operation of – the processes underpinning the evolution of a 
successful strategy for competitiveness development in elite sport.  
 
It should not, however, be overlooked that the changes were as much about 
removing obvious obstacles to success as they were about fostering exceptional 
performers. Prior to Lottery funding being made available, the UK was 
competing against many already well funded and organised teams. The 
combination of stable funding, strategic leadership and a system within which to 
develop athletic competitive capabilities quickly levelled the playing field so 
that UK elite athletes and teams could compete with those of other countries on 
a more equal footing. Thus, removing prior handicaps may also go a long way 
towards explaining the speed of the turnaround in British Olympic fortunes. 
  
This is also true of the environment within which many British businesses 
operate, except that step changes in finance and support have yet to come. The 
UK is one of the very few developed countries without a system for directly 
supplying finance and other resources to growing businesses. Germany, for 
example, has a business bank; and the German government underwrites bank 
loans to businesses in order to spread the risks involved in lending to start-ups, 
which, like lottery funding for UK sport, has the effect of reducing reliance on 
exchequer funding. Other services, such as legal services, are also provided to 
German businesses, allowing smaller firms to focus on their core business and 
to avoid distraction by other issues. For smaller businesses in particular, access 
to stable long-term bank funding fosters a focus on the growth and development 
of competitiveness, rather than constant financial concerns serving as a 
distraction. This availability of ‘low maintenance’ finance, on competitive 
terms, is thus comparable to the system of sport funding, where it allows a 
similarly sharp focus on what the organisation is there to do, rather than how it 
is to be funded. 
 
The absence of a source of longer-term, stable bank finance for smaller UK 
businesses has its roots in the historical development of British industry. Unlike 
many nations which industrialised later, almost from the beginning of the 
industrial revolution, UK firms have been reliant on the stock market for 
finance. This meant that growth typically required selling a significant stake to 
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share holders. Whilst this can be an effective source of funding, widely-
dispersed ownership – particularly where investors collectively own the 
majority of the shares – has been recognized as a constraint on the ability of 
senior managers to focus on the productive purpose of the business.76 This is 
due to the need to prioritize the short-term interests of shareholders and avoid 
the risk of hostile action, often to the detriment of the longer-term competitive 
development of the business. 
 
Since investment in productive activities necessarily precedes the realization of 
returns – often over a medium or long term period of time – facilitating access 
to a cost effective source of finance for new or existing businesses during a 
recession would make a credible contribution to economic recovery. However, 
although attempts to make more credit available to smaller businesses have 
been made, they have so far lacked the relative scale and clarity that was the 
hallmark of funding for sport – and they have not significantly changed the 
game. Efforts to encourage existing banks to lend to businesses, such as Project 
Merlin, announced in February 2011, which was to deliver £190bn to 
businesses, have been largely unsuccessful. This is in no small part the result of 
government attempting to keep using the same system of funding as before – an 
historic, rather than forward-looking strategy – rather than designing something 
fit for purpose. A step in this direction has more recently been made, partly in 
response to the findings of Tim Breedon’s report on long-term structural 
problems in the supply of finance to UK businesses. In September 2012, UK 
Business Secretary Vince Cable announced plans to create a UK Business Bank 
that would be independent of existing banks and financed by the wholesale 
money markets.77 Like UK Sport, which distributes funding to organisations 
and individuals in elite sport, the UK Business Bank would be set-up and 
operated at arm’s length from government. Whether it would also play any kind 
of coordinating role, comparable to that of UK Sport, is at present unclear – as 
is whether or not it will be able to provide a step change similar to that in sport.  
 
The UK elite sport strategy creates an environment that also delivers other 
resources in support of the building of athletic competitiveness capabilities. In 
many ways, these are the sporting equivalent to horizontal and vertical 
industrial policies – they are aimed at strengthening both the ‘supply side’ of the 
sport sector in the UK and particular support services, such as sport technology 
and sport medicine. By providing a steady supply of sporting talent, for 
example, the Home Countries Sports Councils provide the framework within 
which athletic abilities in mass-participation sports are developed. This creates 
the pool of athletic talent that can be drawn upon for elite sport. For elite 
athletes, the provision of required resources (such as sporting equipment and 
sport medical services) and the removal of obstacles (such as the distraction of 
having to balance training with the demands of full time employment) allows 
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athletes to concentrate more fully on competition. UK Sport also makes sure 
that there are individuals in key locations within the international sporting 
community to ensure a voice for UK elite sport in decisions affecting the 
development of sport, globally. As these examples illustrate, institutions have 
been put into place to create an environment that enables improvements in 
competitive capabilities and international competitive success and supports the 
more specific processes designed to deliver medals in international sporting 
events. 
 
Considering what industry might learn from these approaches in sport, a similar 
logic applies. But in the case of industry, competitive success is realized in 
markets. Since markets are institutions that rely upon supporting non-market 
institutions and policies in order to function well, the provision of such a 
supporting framework can serve as an enabling factor for the efforts of firms 
and industrial sectors to realize their competitive potential. These might include 
both horizontal and vertical policies in support of learning and innovation, 
which is the driving force behind improvements in international industrial 
competitiveness. Institutions, such as universities, research centres and technical 
institutes, are important supports for the processes of technological progress and 
of knowledge generation, absorption and commercial exploitation. Due to the 
dynamic and evolutionary nature of economic progress, institutions supporting 
the process of recognizing and responding to changes in the social, political and 
economic environment – i.e., taking advantage of new opportunities and 
removing obstacles and constraints, avoiding lock-in to outmoded activities and 
facilitating advancement to better ones – are also important in supporting the 
competitive advancement of firms and industries. 
 
4.3. Institutional structure - supporting competitive improvement  
 
At the level of elite sport, itself, the British Olympic team’s competitive success 
is founded on a system providing high level strategic leadership and support 
from UK Sport and the NSGBs and an institutional system to facilitate 
coordination of the processes required for both the identification of talent and 
continuous competitive improvement in elite sport. Strategic leadership 
facilitates the development and articulation of objectives and the sharing of 
information in institutions involving both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
interaction.  
 
The strategic partnership between UK Sport and the NSGBs is one of ‘joint 
governance’, the purpose of which is to create and maintain a system that 
supports development of the capabilities required for international competitive 
success and within which promising athletes and teams are able to develop and 
progress. 
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By providing high-level strategic leadership and support, allocating predictable 
funding, articulating the conditions for support and overseeing the process by 
which performance is monitored, success is rewarded and under-performance is 
sanctioned, UK Sport and the NSGBs provide the institutional framework 
within which the international competitiveness of elite sport athletes and teams 
is developed and strengthened. However, the coordination and effort that goes 
into actually delivering medals takes place at the grass-roots level, within the 
NSGBs, where talent is identified and the processes supporting the competitive 
development of UK elite athletes and sporting teams takes place. 
 
The competitive development system in elite sport was largely built upon the 
existing institutional framework within sport; and only one new institution – 
UK Sport – was created. However, there was significant change in the 
resourcing of talent identification and development, the uses to which lottery 
funding could be put, and the role played by the NSGBs. This institutional 
structure is deceptively simple; but along with a stable source of finance and 
strategic leadership, it has much to offer in terms of ideas about institutional 
design for developing competitiveness within UK industry.  
 
As noted above, the commitment to sport by successive UK governments – 
even successive ministers for sport – has been subject to the vagaries of politics. 
Nevertheless, the few political decisions since the early 1990s that have been 
made, have radically changed the environment within which elite sport operates. 
These have included national lottery funding; permitting the use of lottery 
funding for resources other than facilities; enabling key institutions to focus on 
specific areas of specialisation; and the government’s support (across 
administrations) for hosting the UK Olympic Games in London, creating a 
longer-term focus from the time the bid was accepted.  These were largely one-
off decisions that happened to play a positive role in the evolution of the UK’s 
elite sport programme. But they demonstrate the value of the joint governance 
approach to strategic decision-making in UK elite sport. Since the NSGBs have 
the knowledge of the local circumstances confronting their sports, they are the 
institutions best-placed to participate in high-level decisions that will affect 
them. The relative infrequency of politically-driven government decisions 
affecting UK elite sport thus lends stability to the system. 
 
The effectiveness of the strategic collaboration between UK Sport and the 
NSGBs – and its ability to deliver sustainable improvements in competitiveness 
– is dependent on the top-down and bottom-up elements remaining in balance, 
with neither being captured by the other. The loss of this balance can be 
extremely counterproductive: Excessive top-down influence can result in the 
interference of political ideology, with strategic plans embodying insufficient 
local knowledge and understanding of the potential for winning and the 
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requirements for achieving it; it also risks inflexibility. Conversely, capture of 
the top by the bottom risks chaos – and a situation akin to that which produced 
the 2007/8 financial crisis. 
 
All of this has clear implications for smaller businesses in competitive market 
places. Firstly, the fewer the changes required to build an institutional 
framework capable of supporting the strengthening of industrial 
competitiveness, the easier and quicker it will be to implement. Thus, to the 
degree that industrial strategy can build upon the existing institutional 
framework – including such institutions as governmental agencies with 
responsibility for industry, trade and industry bodies, universities and technical 
institutes – the more effective it is likely to be in delivering rapid results. 
 
Secondly, whereas sport has a regular schedule of events, with inbuilt and easily 
identified criteria for success, this is less clearly the case in industry, where 
there are fewer fixed points and success can be based on a wide range of 
indices. As a result, for industrial strategy to deliver its objectives, the input 
from actors in industries and firms is even more crucially important than it is in 
sport, particularly with respect to identifying not only areas to target for 
development but also those where support is no longer either needed or 
justified. Similarly, whilst the more obvious indicators of business success 
include such things as export sales, number of employees, revenue growth and 
product innovation, there are others that are less obvious. Here, it is important to 
develop institutions capable of soliciting information from organizations that 
are at the cutting-edge – and hence more likely to be able to identify indicators 
that are more specific to existing and emerging technologies, innovations and 
competitive situations. The design of industrial strategy is therefore necessarily 
reliant on institutions facilitating and coordinating information flows between 
the government and industrial sectors as well as between these institutions and 
local level ones both within industry and sectors involved in the processes of 
innovation and knowledge generation.  
 
Thirdly, the effectiveness of a collaborative strategic relationship between 
public sector and non-governmental organisations is predicated on the ability of 
government to implement strategic change in areas such as funding, the legal 
framework and conditions for support. But for these changes to be appropriate, 
the sharing of information among the various institutions within the system is 
essential. Thus, in an industrial context, institutions facilitating effective 
communication – between government and industry sectors, between sectors 
and the firms within them and between businesses themselves – are crucially 
important.  
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All of this puts a premium on the quality of relationships and on shared vision 
and objectives, which are generally in evidence within the elite sports system. 
But whilst the vision and aims are shared and relationships are generally 
cooperative, an effective strategy for developing and improving international 
competitiveness – whether it be in sport or in business – is one that also fosters 
competition, which serves as a mechanism for strengthening the competitive 
capabilities of teams and athletes, industrial sectors and firms. Without this, the 
strategy would clearly fail in its primary purpose – whether in sport or business. 
In short, the key to success lies in the nature of relationships, the balance 
between public and private institutions and the clarity of purpose. Relationships 
are not only as important as outcomes; the two are mutually dependent. 
Maintaining a balance, whilst at the same time maintaining the ability to evolve 
to meet changing requirements over time is, in many ways, the greatest 
challenge for any competitive system.  
 
4.4. Systems that learn and develop 
 
Not all of the ideas contributing to the successful competitive evolution of the 
British Olympic team since the 1996 Summer Games were learned from 
scratch. Many were adapted from other teams and from best practice. However, 
they were not simply transplanted from one nation to another; they were instead 
used as a source of inspiration to help deliver the required changes but in a UK 
context. When Australian elite sport took inspiration from the East German 
model of building an elite sports programme, for example, it was concluded that 
whilst many of the ideas underpinning the East German approach were 
transferable, others (notably the programme of performance-enhancing drug-use 
by athletes) were inconsistent with an Australian context. Similarly when the 
UK later took ideas from the Australian elite sport system, whilst some 
elements of the programme were considered applicable and adapted to fit the 
British context, others were deemed to be of less value. An equivalent to the 
system of Australian sports academies, for example, was discussed; but partly 
due to cost and geographic proximity and partly due to difficulties in 
fundamentally altering the institutional structure underpinning British sport, the 
UK system was instead built around the existing system of NSGBs.  
 
Similarly, an industrial strategy for the UK might well be rooted in existing 
trade and industry bodies, and in universities with experience in the generation 
and commercialization of new knowledge and technologies. The process of 
integrating institutions closer to the grass-roots level facilitates the system’s 
ability to recognize and respond to change, to learn and develop more quickly, 
as it becomes progressively more sensitive to emerging opportunities and 
challenges. Taking local culture, institutional structure and conditions into 
account makes development not only simpler, politically, but also cheaper and 
30 
 
quicker. Fully understanding the ideas behind the changes being made, when 
they are being adapted from other economies, rather than merely the appearance 
of them, thus becomes a crucial factor. 
 
Another area for learning that is important to both sport and business, is 
learning from both failures – even relative ones – as well as successes. Within 
the UK elite sport system, the expectation is one of winning, not merely 
participating. This was evident in the profuse apologies from London 2012 
athletes for not winning gold, even when they won silver or bronze – a far cry 
from the British culture of old. However, the response to under-achievement is 
constructive: Preparation and performance are carefully reviewed, to identify 
influential factors and develop remedial strategies; less successful athletes and 
teams that still have medal potential are helped to compete more effectively. 
They are also able to learn from more successful teams. British Swimming is a 
good example. Having failed to meet its medal target in London 2012, a post-
games review was quickly underway. According to Michael Scott, British 
Swimming’s Performance Director,  
 
‘Everything is on the table. We cannot close our mind to any ideas or 
suggestion … We have made approaches and not necessarily to people 
within the sport of swimming. You have to look at Team GB as a whole 
and say there is expertise in this country that could be used to sharpen our 
focus.’78 
 
Team GB also continues to learn from best practice and the development of 
other countries’ teams. So there is potential for the bar to be continuously 
raised, through a virtuous cycle of competitive development and improvement, 
nationally and internationally.  
 
The same can be said about the possibilities for cumulative learning in the 
process of strengthening the international competitiveness of small and medium 
sized manufacturers. With an effective industrial strategy and appropriate 
institutional structures, UK businesses would have the improved potential to 
learn from best practice and from others’ experiences – both domestically and 
internationally. They would not only be better equipped to adapt and implement 
the strategies, approaches and institutions upon which international 
competitiveness might be developed; they would also be able to learn from 
others, such as the successful export driven manufacturing sectors of Germany's 
‘Mittelstand’, the Italian industrial districts and the industrial networks and 
clusters of other countries.  
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5. Conclusions  
 
The UK’s experience with industrial policy has been a chequered one. The first 
of the advanced economies to industrialize, Britain was also the first to evolve a 
strategy involving high levels of targeted government intervention to support 
the process of industrial development – as did the other major developed 
economies following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. Between World 
War One and the end of World War Two, there was a pause, followed by 
another period of targeted industrial intervention, this time aimed at the re-
industrialization of war-torn Western Europe and Japan. For Britain, belief in 
the superiority of the American model of mass production – and pressure from 
politically well-connected special interests – meant that instead of ‘picking 
winners’ and investing in new industries and technologies, industrial policy 
tended to take the form of ‘shoring-up losers’, supporting growth by mergers 
and acquisitions (thereby creating a ‘too big to fail’ problem) and prioritizing 
the interests of the financial services sector and the City of London, often to the 
detriment of UK manufacturers. As a result, by the time the stagflationary crises 
of the 1970s arrived, it was evident that services – especially finance – was 
rapidly over-taking manufacturing as a driver of economic growth; and there 
was a retreat from active industrial policy, which was strengthened under the 
Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher during the 1980s. 
 
During the 1990s, concerns about competitiveness resulted in acceptance of a 
role for the state in encouraging the development of technological and 
productive capabilities. But the failure to evolve a coherent strategy for 
addressing the cumulative processes undermining British manufacturing 
capability – and the growing acceptance of asset bubbles as legitimate engines 
for economic growth – meant that little was done to address the growing 
imbalance between the financial and productive sides of the British economy. 
Although the government was forced to step-in when asset bubbles burst, the 
damage caused by the collapse of successively larger bubbles was camouflaged 
by the euphoria accompanying the inflation of the next – until the bursting of 
the housing bubble in 2007/8 from which the UK economy has yet to recover. 
 
We thus come full circle and return to David Cameron’s contention (quoted at 
the start of this paper) that ‘What we need to do in this country is a massive 
rebalancing of our economy. We have been too reliant on government spending 
on housing and finance ... We have got to be more reliant on manufacturing and 
investment.’79 Although he did not use the term, the implications for industrial 
strategy are clear. Since such a fundamental restructuring of the economy 
cannot be left to the random interplay of market forces, the inescapable 
conclusion is that the UK’s recovery requires an industrial strategy. But what 
should it include and how might it be evolved? 
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The significance of the sporting case is that it was evolved and successfully 
implemented in the British social, political and economic context, building on 
and improving existing institutional capabilities. Ideas were taken from other 
countries and from best practice; but they were adapted to fit British 
circumstances – and they have been improved upon as the strategy has evolved. 
Thus, although there are details that are specific to particular sports, there are 
also aspects of the general strategic approach that can be used to inform the 
design and implementation of a strategy aimed at developing and improving the 
international competitive performance of UK industry. Analysis of the process 
by which UK elite sport effectively reversed its competitive fortunes since the 
1996 Atlanta Summer Games thus offers insight into how a competitiveness 
strategy for industry might also be evolved.  
 
The two broad areas for strategy that emerge from the elite sport case include: 
(1) the creation and maintenance of an enabling competitive environment 
(which includes institutions providing access to finance) and (2) the creation 
and maintenance of an institutional system providing not only strategic 
leadership and vision as well as a strategy for achieving it but also support for 
the processes involved in both identifying potential winners and facilitating 
coordination of the efforts required for the development and improvement of 
world-class competitive capabilities. The strategic approach is also one that 
encourages and facilitates processes that foster learning and innovation as well 
as adaptation in response to changes in the competitive environment. 
 
The institutional framework supporting competitive improvement in UK elite 
sport was founded on the basic institutional structure already in existence, with 
only one new public sector institution, UK Sport, being created. The system was 
therefore easier and quicker to build because by building on existing 
institutions, it was easier to implement the required changes and to garner the 
support of those needed to make it succeed in practice. The primary changes 
involved a sharpening of focus in the institutions at the top of the system (UK 
Sport and the NSGBs) and the creation of an institutional system to coordinate 
the efforts required to facilitate the development of competitive capabilities that 
would deliver medals in international sporting events. Similarly, UK industrial 
strategy should build upon existing institutional capabilities of both public 
sector and non-governmental institutions and the knowledge residing in industry 
and trade bodies, universities and other such institutions involved in industry 
and in the processes supporting innovation.  
 
It is important to note that whilst the knowledge of what is required to deliver 
competitive success often resides at the local level, the strategic leadership 
required to actually implement the changes required to deliver success can only 
come from the top. In this, the supply of finance assumes a pivotal role. In the 
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case of elite sport, setting up the national lottery and allocating a proportion of 
the proceeds to sport required both high level political will by the John Major 
Government and targeted intervention – both of which were also instrumental in 
the establishment of UK Sport. In the case of industry, clearly, finance remains 
a significant problem, leading to other difficulties. Reliance on a dispersed 
shareholder-ownership model of corporate governance has been both a source 
of vulnerability and a constraint on business growth; and, particularly since the 
2007/8 financial crisis, the inability to access sufficient levels of bank finance to 
support industrial development has contributed to the progressive under-
representation of manufacturing businesses (and other sectors with a relatively 
long payback period) in the economy. However, in contrast to the elite sport 
case, the political will to intervene has been slow to materialize and the 
government appears to be hesitant to become actively involved. Thus, the 
effectiveness – if not even the possibility – of UK industrial strategy would 
seem to rely upon securing the support of a high level ‘champion’ in 
government. Further, given the importance of access to a reliable source of 
finance, the public sector strategic lead body might well take the form of the 
proposed UK Business Bank. 
 
So what should go into an industrial strategy for the UK? Broadly, it requires 
high-level political leadership and support as well as articulation of a vision for 
the future of the British economy and the position of industry within it; it also 
requires a strategy for achieving it.  It requires an enabling competitive 
environment, including access to competitive and reliable sources of finance as 
well as other services required for industrial sectors and firms to achieve 
international competitive success. It requires a joint system of governance to 
ensure balance in the relationship between public and private sector actors and 
institutions to facilitate information flows between government and industrial 
sectors, between industrial sectors and the firms within them and between firms 
themselves. It requires an institutional framework within which international 
competitive capabilities specific to industrial sectors and firms can be developed 
and improved. Finally, because of the dynamic and unpredictable nature of 
markets and technologies, it requires the institutional capability to recognize 
and respond effectively to change. In part, this will depend upon an institutional 
framework to facilitate and coordinate the processes required for the 
identification of new, promising industries and technologies – and the 
generation of supporting resources including requisite knowledge and capital 
requirements (physical, human and social) – as well as out-moded industries 
and technologies, the decline of which will need to be effectively managed. The 
details of such a strategy will depend upon the local circumstances and 
institutional capabilities of particular UK industrial sectors and the firms within 
them –which is beyond the scope of this paper but will be the focus of further 
research.  
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A significant contributor to the success of the elite sports strategy was, initially 
at least, not so much having a better system than anyone else, as it was having 
one at all. In the case of industrial strategy, although the debate about ‘picking 
winners’ has been a long-standing one, the absence of a coherent strategy to 
ensure an enabling environment for effective competition in markets and to lead 
and support the development and strengthening of competitive capabilities of 
British businesses and industrial sectors – a strategy capable of producing 
globally successful players – has produced the current low point in UK 
industrial performance. Ensuring competitiveness at the highest possible level 
requires an informed strategy, which in turn relies upon an integrated 
institutional system to support the dynamic processes required for achieving it. 
Attempting to pick winners without such a framework and without a shared 
vision is to a large extent the story of the UK financial sector and the City of 
London – which is what motivated David Cameron’s comment in the first place. 
Our contention is that there are clear examples within the UK – the strategy for 
elite sport being one – that illustrate how to go about building an institutional 
framework within which to develop the capabilities required for world class 
competitive success in industry. The time has come for the political rhetoric 
about industrial strategy to finally give way to active progress towards 
articulating a vision for the future of British industry and a strategy for 
achieving it.  
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